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international law. Many people did not understand him. He was well ahead of us. I myself did not understand why this was necessary. Later, of course, it became obvious that Sakharov was right. In the past we had laws, but they were violated; his suggestions were the most important guarantee against a repetition of repressions in the future. It also occurred to us that even after the Soviet Union became a law-based state-I myself doubt this will ever happen-Memorial would continue to act as a public force to oversee and uphold international law on Soviet territory.
Sakharov was elected chairman of the organization. We also elected a governing board of twenty-five people, of which I was one. This was a long way from just building a monument. We produced a charter and program, pledging, as members of Memorial, to fight against all manifestations of totalitarianism, whether in the past or future. We did not differentiate between repressions in various eras (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev). We saw as our main task the need to move forward to a law-based state through educational work, especially among the young generation. Totalitarianism was in the first instance a question of consciousness. Over ideas, we wrote, only other ideas could be victorious: not the fist, not the prison cell, not barbed wire.
Memorial does not take upon itself the goal of judging and condemning people. We are not going to be a court, to organize trials. We categorically refuse the use of force. Instead, we name the people who participated in repressions in order to make public their past activities, have their names recalled, and thereby inform the rest of the population. We are guided by the principle of enlightenment, not revenge. Despite the nature of our enemies, in fact because of it, we refuse to adopt their methods. We have never made any statements about trying to become a political party. We have no desire to become a party seeking power. Our field of activities includes constant public scrutiny of the observance of laws, shaping public opinion, and the defense of citizens' interests and rights.
We obtained use of a photocopier and every delegate at the constituent assembly received a copy of both our charter and our program, which were put to a vote. The delegates voted to adopt them, after which the documents were sent, in February 1989, to the Supreme Soviet for official registration to obtain legal status. Unfortunately, however, to this day [November 1990] we have still not been registered.2 Q.: What has been the attitude of the authorities to the registration of Memorial? A.: At first [in 1988] the authorities explained that the Supreme Soviet was soon to be reelected and transformed, so it would be best to wait for the new Supreme Soviet to be formed, and then we'd be registered. A new system of competitive elections was designed to first convoke what was called a Congress of Peoples' Deputies, from which the new Supreme Soviet was to be formed. One-third of the seats to the Congress were alloted to "public organizations" (the party, the trade unions, the writers union). Memorial supported several candidates, but lacking official legal status, we were not permitted to field our candidates as a public organization.
When the new Supreme Soviet assembled in late May and early June 1989, our leaders (Sakharov, Kariakin, Yevtushenko), who were elected to the overseeing Congress of Peoples' Deputies, approached the authorities once again. Our request for registration was again denied, but now we were given a different explanation. Anatolii Lukianov, Gorbachev's lieutenant, said that no new public organizations could be registered because there was as yet no law on public organizations. Only in 1990 was a proposal for a law on public organizations published for discussion, but it has not yet been adopted and no one knows when it will be.3
Meanwhile, two million rubles have been received at the bank in Memorial's name, but this money is criminally frozen. The Minister of Culture has simply taken over the funds. We are not permitted to publish a newspaper, or anything else with the money. How is it possible that the people's money was illegally taken over by the Minister of Culture? The authorities claim that the money can only be used for construction of the monument, specifically to pay for cement and marble, and because the Nineteenth Party Conference appointed the Ministry of Culture to oversee the construction of the monument, the Ministry assumed control over the funds. Of course, people sent money from around the country for many purposesthe creation of a library and archive, publications-and not simply for a piece of cement.
Despite this naked theft of our funds by the authorities, however, our activities continue. During 1989-1990 Memorial took part in more than thirty political actions around the country, such as organizing demonstrations and serving as outside witnesses at political trials. Also, you must remember that the people who make up our leadership are members of the opposition in the new Soviet parliament and as such spend most of their time criticizing the government. It is for these reasons that our money has been frozen and we have been refused registration.
Memorial has the potential to become a truly mass organization, given the sheer size of the antitotalitarian constituency that totalitarianism created. We have scores of regional branches around the country, including those in the national republics. Our membership continually increases, and clearly the authorities are afraid of our coming together, with a unified structure, in the center of the country. Memorial is the neformal [nonstate association] with the greatest social support; we exist on the level of a Popular Front, with a huge following in society. We could become one of the strongest political forces. Q.: What happened to the plans for a memorial complex? A.: As 1989 gave way to 1990, many of us involved in Memorial became concerned that, because the people who had managed to survive the camps would not live forever, we had to erect some kind of monument as soon as possible. So, it was decided to bring a stone from the former Solovki labor camps4 and place it, with an inscription, in the square next to the KGB headquarters at Liubianka. The Moscow city soviet, which is now controlled by the democrats, gave its permission to use the public space. It was decided to carry out the ceremony on 30 October [1990] , which [since 1974] has traditionally been celebrated by the human rights movement in our country as Political Prisoners Day.
There was a great debate about what to write for the inscription. Some people insisted that the word totalitarianism be used, others wanted it to mention Stalinism, or the total number of victims, and so on. It was finally decided to dedicate the stone "in honor of the millions of victims of the totalitarian regime." I consider this formulation appropriate, and am pleased that a memorial has been established.
But to this day [November 1990] we at Memorial have no permanent facility and are not permitted to use official archives. Gorbachev, who spoke with Peoples' Deputies Daniil Granin and Vitalii Goldanskii, replied to a question about Memorial, "We do not need yet another political party." But Memorial has never tried to become a political party. Gorbachev is smearing us with this (as if it were a crime to form a political party and he himself could decide who should and who shouldn't do so). Anyway, he could simply read our documents which explain who we are and never mention becoming a political party. It seems that the authorities, Gorbachev included, are hoping that without registration the movement will start to die, as people get frustrated and leave. The authorities are trying to strangle the movement and to blame any breakdown on us, letting out rumors about our disorganization, unprofessionalism, and internal squabbling. Q.: What in fact has been going on inside Memorial? A.: The authorities' persistent refusal to register Memorial did exacerbate some of the tensions within the movement. There were, for example, arguments about the need to avoid angering the authorities by limiting our activities to nonpolitical issues. Relations between some of the more active members of Memorial have often been strained: Who is not satisfied with someone else's leadership, and so on. Such disputes, although inevitable, are a shame.
One group within Memorial, which as an umbrella organization includes people from all political viewpoints, threatened that, if Memorial did not divorce itself from politics, this group would start a separate nonpolitical association. That is in fact what they did, but their action was premeditated and had little to do with any supposed deficiencies inside Memorial.
In July 1990, Nikolai Numerov called a meeting and, in Gorbachev-like fashion, dictatorially pronounced himself president of the breakaway All-Union Association of Those Who Suffered from Stalinism. He also appointed a vice president and a legislative branch. His mimicking of Gorbachev was slavishly literal, but this was more than some kind of bad joke. Numerov was after personal power and in the bargain hoped to discredit the existing Memorial organization.
Numerov is a party member, the "hand," as we say, of the Moscow city party committee. Through him the Party sought to drive a wedge between the leadership of Memorial and the old veterans of the repressions, citing Memorial's lack of effectiveness and claiming the splinter group would achieve what Memorial supposedly was not able to. The new association, which has around two thousand mem- We need a law on the formation of a unified archival system with guaranteed public access. This is one of the goals Memorial is currently fighting for (along with greater funding for the archives, whose facilities are in disastrous shape). All institutions located inside the country must be compelled to turn over their documents within a specified period. We need a regular process for determining the length of time after which documents become declassified. And, I want to emphasize, we need public scrutiny over the process of declassification of these archives, because we do not trust the institutions to observe the laws the state may pass. What's to stop them from destroying documents, if they haven't done so already? Q.: Perhaps this is a good time to relate the story of how you personally became involved in Memorial. A.: The story of how I came to be associated with the struggle to restore our country's historical memory goes back some time. When I was still in the early years of grammer school, I took a great interest in Soviet history. Later, when I was in the seventh grade I discovered by accident in the library the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, in which I saw strange phrases in the biographies of important officials: "unlawfully repressed," "posthumously rehabilitated," "repressed during the cult of personality." I couldn't for the life of me make out what these phrases meant. I noticed that in the biographical information in the encyclopedia, the year of death was usually the same for everyone: 1937, 38, 37, etc. It seemed that almost all our famous people, at least those worthy of a biographical note, died between the years 1936 and 1939. So what happened during those years? There was no war then; I had been told in school that the war began in 1941. When I was twelve years old I began transcribing the names of all the people described as repressed from the encyclopedia into a notebook.
Somehow I knew it was better not to ask anybody about these things. This was already suggested by the lack of concrete information given in the encyclopedia. I began to look through other reference materials published in our country. For example, in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia [2d edition], the years of death are given, but the expression "repressed" is not used. Why? In one encyclopedia things are put one way, in another, differently. I was determined to solve this mystery. It turned out that the Historical Encyclopedia was published in the early 1960s, that is, during the Khrushchev period, but the Great Soviet Encyclopedia appeared in the 1970s, that is, Brezhnev's time. I came to the conclusion that evidently the "line" about these people changed when our leadership changed. Why, I had no idea. At that age I was incapable of figuring out why, but I did notice the existence of a mystery.
I was afraid to ask anyone at home. I lived with my mother and younger sister (my parents were divorced when I was an infant; I don't remember my father). I did ask my mother if anyone in our family was repressed; she said no. Repressions were not a subject that was discussed at home. There was nothing anti-Soviet about our family.
To figure out the mystery, I continued to compose a list of people's names from the Historical Encyclopedia. There were altogether 350 names of those repressed. I thought this was all of them; I assumed that everyone who was repressed was in the encyclopedia. There were those in the other encyclopedia who died during the same time, but it did not say they had been repressed. I recorded their names too, but placed a question mark after them.
In the ninth grade I discovered the Encyclopedia of Writers, which had many new (for me) names of people who were said to have been repressed. Only then did I conclude that there had been more than 350 people who had been repressed. I added their names, six hundred more, to the list and removed the question marks from the almost three hundred names out of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Keep in mind that these encyclopedias are multivolume works; all of this was a great deal of work.
It My job was to write numbers on the pages of files. This was my entire responsibility-the lowest possible level (I had had no special training as an archivist). I did this work for a few weeks. I was not permitted to enter the areas where the hidden files were kept, but I started to snoop around to look for materials on repressed individuals. I had no idea whether they were even in the archive where I worked, but I discovered that many such collections were in fact right there. I did all this secretly. Q.: How old were you at the time? A.: I was 17, just out of [high] school. Q.: What kinds of materials did you find? A.: I saw, for example, a lot of materials on personnel-not the actual files, which were in the KGB archives, but reference cards about the files held by the KGB. I had stumbled upon a huge personnel index of all the employees of the NKVD. In other words, I stumbled upon exactly what I was looking for, and I began to study the personnel files closely. I wrote out the information they contained, smuggled it out of the archive, and recopied it onto note cards at home. By this time I had already accumulated ten thousand names, arranged alphabetically, from reference sources, books, journals, newspapers, and so on, which I had been combing for the past several years. At the same time, to move to a second example, in the materials from the Juridical Academy I came across instructions written during the early part of the terror to train new specialists, not through the normal three-year courses, but in three months. Judges and procurators in three months! At the highest levels of the state bureaucracy! Here was a lesson about the purges: not only would their effects be profound and lasting in many aspects, but the administrative apparatus that was to help carry them out had had to plan for the purges' devastating effects on the administrative apparatus itself. Q.: How could you be sure you were seeing complete and not sanitized files? A.: Some of the materials mentioned in certain files was missing. This could only mean that at some point material had been removed to the institutional archives at NKVD headquarters. But there was a great deal still there, and it was as rich as the black earth. At first I used notebooks, into which I wrote the names of those repressed in the order I uncovered them. But because I had to look through all the notebooks to find a single name, I decided instead to begin using index cards and, on the analogy of a library card catalogue, to write out a single card for each person and to order them alphabetically. My cards contain full names, dates of birth and death, nationality, social background, year of entrance to the party, participation in revolutionary events and in public and political life, last office held at the time of arrest, the exact facts of the repression and rehabilitation, and lastly the date the index card was composed and the sources used. I felt sure that one day the raw material I was collecting would be processed and analyzed. I describe my methodology in greater detail in Sovetskaia bibliografiia, No. 5, 1988. Q.: In other words, even after you began turning up important insights into the machinery that produced and maintained the documents cataloguing the terror, you were still interested less in an inquiry into the nature and operation of the organs of repression than in a compilation of parallel personnel files that give special attention to the facts of repression? A.: Yes, that's correct. So, returning to the two years I spent in the army (November 1982-November 1984), I managed during that time to do another five hundred cards based on military memoirs in the army library. I could have been sent to Afghanistan, but instead I was dispatched in a roundabout way to the Baltics, to a special unit charged with intercepting communications signals. My job was just to move a satellite dish from a control panel in an underground bunker. Whatever signals came in, officers did the decoding, and I was never told what information we captured.
During my free time in the army, to keep my mind from corroding, I wrote a novel called the "Brothers Kaganovich." I first got interested in this remarkable family of four brothers when I discovered that in 1929, as a present to Stalin on his fiftieth birthday, Lazar Kaganovich had a dacha built for him in Nikolino Hill, about thirty kilometers outside Moscow, where Kaganovich already had his own dacha. All the Kaganovich brothers were close to Stalin at one time, so I decided to investigate them and did some reading. Then, once in the army, from memory, I wrote six chapters, which were confiscated by the army's "special department" soon after I began to read them aloud to the soldiers. I got seven days in the brig and was expressly warned not to engage in "anti-Soviet activity."
The army's "special department" asked me where I obtained my information. I said it was from memory, but they didn't believe me. Their threat to send me to a military tribunal was enough to make me stop writing the novel, but I continued to add to the card file from the sources in the library. Somehow I managed to take them out with me when I was demobilized in 1984. Q.: You seem to have managed to do a wealth of things that confound expectations. What happened next? A.: In January 1985 I resumed my job at the archives, not at TsGAOR, but at TsGANKh, also a state archival institution (for the economy). The army had sent TsGAOR documents to the effect that I "had disorganized an army collective with anti-Soviet activities." This disqualified me from a job there [TsGAOR], but for whatever reason, TsGANKh saw fit to hire me. At TsGANKh, however, they kept me away from the archival materials themselves. I worked in the finding-aids [opisi] section, that is, in the department of documents on the documents, and learned about all the files that the archive held. This was enlightening, but I knew that for my larger goals I had to change jobs. Yet not a single department of TsGAOR would accept me back. I also tried and was rejected at TsGALI and TsPA IML (at the latter I was told one had to be a party member).
It occurred to me to have a look in the internal archival guidebook, to see which other archives there were. I came across a reference to the archive of the Supreme Court and figured that was a good place to try to find a job. There was no indication in the guide that it was a supersecret archive. I telephoned. The person at the other end of the line said come on down. I went over and found out that I had to go through a security clearance. I filled out the very detailed forms, and was told to wait two months while the KGB looked into things. This led me to believe that I wouldn't get clearance, as the materials at the Supreme Court were under the highest level of secrecy, and I had had a bad experience at The archive is located in the basement of the building of the functioning Supreme Court. As soon as they are no longer needed upstairs, the files are transported downstairs, where they are haphazardly piled up. No one besides those employed by the Supreme Court ever sees them, or even knows about their existence. This is a perfect example of an institutional archive. As an insider, I learned a great deal about the rules and regulations for creating and managing court cases, information that remains utterly concealed from the public.
To be precise, these files do not contain all the information of a case but only the information thought necessary for the court to render a judgment. Detailed case materials that were sent over temporarily from the NKVD had to be returned. It is important to remember that those who were judged by the so-called dvoikas and troikas-organs not provided for in the constitution that arose during the heat of the terror to handle the enormous case overload-did not appear at their "trials." They were judged in absentia. But those who were judged by the Military Collegium and the Supreme Court were called to appear. As a result, in cases before the latter two bodies, there is a stenographic record of the proceedings in which the voices of the accused are recorded.
When asked if they had anything to say after hearing the charges, most people stood up and repudiated the accusations. (Previously it was not known that many people had resisted. Indeed, in the absence of documentation, it was often assumed that they confessed, or at least put up no opposition.) The court then adjourned for three minutes, returning with a guilty verdict and a sentence. In such a way were Tukhachevskii, Bliukher, Meyerhold, and all the rest disposed of. Usually, the whole process of condemning a person to death took fifteen minutes. As for appeals, almost all were rejected. I did find a few cases in which a death sentence was commuted to one of twenty-five years.
Several copies were made of the proceedings: one was sent to the Central Committee (that is, to Stalin), one to the NKVD, one kept by the courts, and so on. In other words, the courts had to report the results of their work to the absolute highest authorities. It was not necessary for these authorities to give specific orders on what to do in any particular case. The NKVD had sent over the case; the court's job was clear, and both Stalin and the NKVD awaited the results. This must be kept in mind when examining the surviving instructions, or lack thereof, for carrying out specific aspects of the terror. It is interesting to note that the courts charged with overturning false convictions did not themselves initiate the process by requesting to see the files of the cases from the KGB. A rehabilitation got underway only after the Central Committee instructed the courts to look into the fate of a particular person, at which point the courts directed an inquiry to the KGB. There was nothing "legal" about rehabilitations; it was all purely political. Q.: But still, the work took a juridical form? A.: Yes. Q.: Did you come across any evidence of rivalry, strife, and cross-purposes among the various components of the repressive apparatus? A.: I can't say I was really looking for that. Q.: You say there were over six hundred thousand rehabilitations in just four years in the 1950s. How did the process of a rehabilitation start? A.: Repressed individuals themselves or their relatives would write an application for rehabilitation to the Central Committee. This application was sent to the procuracy, which then requested the original files and summoned the person in question (if alive) to an interview. The witnesses and the investigating officer, if alive, were also summoned and asked if they stood by their original testimony. People had a chance at last to confront their torturers, many of whom were also tortured by someone else in the system, and on down the line.
When the Military Collegium received the original files along with the "recommendations" of whatever procuracy had looked into the matter, the Collegium rubber-stamped the recommendation of rehabilitation just as it had rubberstamped the death sentences. Virtually all rehabilitations were of people convicted in the prewar period.
It is important to emphasize that the wealth of documents generated by the repressive organs has not been destroyed. On the contrary, the files were once more expanded, as new information was added to the huge folders already created during the repression itself. Detailed reports of a rehabilitation were issued and sent to the Central Committee, Procurator, MVD, and KGB. By contrast, those rehabilitated (or their surviving relatives) received only a tiny scrap of paper acknowledging the fact of rehabilitation, without explanation or apology.
Q.: What an enormous amount of work was involved for the bureaucracy in the rehabilitations.
A.: Indeed. Many of the original documents were found to be confusing and to contain numerous contradictions. Furthermore, there were many cases in which the person eligible for rehabilitation had been shot, or had died in the camps. The original witnesses and investigators had to be sought. And often the courts would find that the investigator of one fabricated case had fabricated others. Sometimes egregious fabricators, called lipachi, were indicted and tried. Most, however, were just retired with pension.
Quite against regulations I managed to remove copies of some of these documents. Of course, I myself did not have direct access to the Supreme Court's photocopying equipment upstairs, but I was permitted to make formal requests that certain materials be copied for work inside the archives. These requests were considered routine and carried out. What was not routine was that I then took the documents home. In the document one can read the names, occupations, sentences given, when they were carried out, whether torture was used and, if so, what kind. Beria, as the first secretary of the Caucasus Regional party committee, had personally initiated the arrests. Most were shot. Beria never liked Ordzhonikidze, but while the latter was Commissar of Heavy Industry, Beria couldn't touch him; as soon as Ordzhonikidze was dead, however, Beria moved against his family members, just as he moved against the members of the Georgian intelligentsia. It was all done out of intense jealousy.
Beginning in 1954, those closest to Beria, all generals in the security apparatus, were secretly tried and convicted: Samson Nadaraia and Rafael Sarkisov, former chiefs of Beria's private guard who pimped for him-ten years; Mikhail MichurinRaver, chief of the MGB, for fabricating cases-shot; Arsenii Putintsev, chief of counterespionage in the MGB, for fabricating the so-called Leningrad Casefifteen years; Arkadii Gertsovskii, for carrying out experiments with biological weapons on prisoners-ten years; Solomon Milshtein, chief of the transport department section of the NKVD, for fabricating the trials of supposed wreckers in transport-shot; Amaiak Kobulov, chief of the MGB administration, for fabricating cases-shot. I could name another two dozen of such people who, during the time of the rehabilitation, continued to be sentenced for mass fabrication until around 1958. This material, which I came across in the archive, has never been made public.
Not all former lipachi were tried-only those for whom there was the greatest amount of compromising material uncovered during the rehabilitation process, and those for whom the Central Committee gave a special order to investigate. Beria's collaborators at the highest level of the police apparatus, however, were quietly yet systematically wiped out. Q.: What struck you most about the rehabilitation documents that you saw? A.: One point worth mentioning is how the material given to the relatives of rehabilitated individuals was falsified, despite the fact that the officials responsible for composing the material had all the correct information in front of them. Two documents were given out: one, on the rehabilitation itself, that testified to the overturning of the previous judgment but in which virtually no other information was given out (the spaces for place, date, and cause of death were left blank); the other document, which supplied information on the death of the person rehabilitated, was falsified to conceal the magnitude of those shot during 1937 and 38. Death rates were invented (1946, 1947 Those arrested en route, say, on a train, can find their files at the place where the case against them first arose (usually where they worked and lived). But if they made it to their destination and only then were arrested, then the files would be kept at their place of arrival. For example, if a person worked, say, in Erevan but was arrested while on a visit in Moscow, the file is in Moscow.
Often it happens that relatives have no idea where their family member was arrested. They write requests for information everywhere and anywhere. The place they ought to apply, and where their request will end up, is the GNITs MVD (the Main Scientific Information Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). It is here in the former "first section" that card files are kept for all those arrested and convicted in the Soviet Union (and not in the KGB, which has the actual case files).
Obviously, there are many similar names in the MVD's catalogue, and one cannot obtain information only knowing a person's name; one must also know the place of arrest. If those requesting information don't know the city of arrest, at least they must know the oblast. If this is not known, they must know where the person last worked prior to being arrested, and so on. When the GNITs has located the person, they issue a piece of paper indicating the KGB branch where the file is kept.
In the replies from GNITs to requests for information on disappeared relatives, there is some astonishing information. It seems that for record-keeping purposes, GNITs numbers each name in the card file. The highest number I have seen in GNITs's replies to requests was one in the sixteen millions. This indicates that at least this many people were convicted of political crimes (that is, they were convicted under article 58). It is possible that the actual number is greater. Q.: Who is included in these figures? A.: Let me emphasize that this is only from the card file for those who were convicted of political crimes. There is an entirely separate card file for those convicted of [regular] criminal offenses. I have never seen a number higher than eight million on any of the answers given to the Supreme Soviet by GNITs from the card file for criminals.
We know that sometimes when the names of those arrested were not known, functionaries charged with filling out the forms would just make something up. Other times, only estimates of total numbers could be given, with the individuals remaining anonymous. No one knows how many people were rounded up and disappeared without a trace, although the number is obviously large. These people's stories may never be retrieved. But the stories of far more people for whom there are documental records are also in danger of being forgotten as long as the relevant documents remain in the hands of the repressive organs. In the meantime, we can show our commitment to recalling their names and fate by attempting to compile our own record, however incomplete. Q.: How long did you remain at the archive of the Military Collegium? A.: From the middle of 1985 to November 1986. During this time I managed to gather on index cards the names of some one hundred thousand people repressed by the Military Collegium and the Supreme Court. Also, I have a list of those rehabilitated by these same institutions that includes not only the figures for the total number of those rehabilitated by year, but the number of their case, witnesses, and information about the original case (such as whether they were tortured). This I achieved in a year and a half. Q.: Why did you leave? A.: It was not by choice. One morning in November 1986, my boss at the archive confronted me with my notebook, throwing it on the table where I worked. I was sent to the special department. My right to enter the archive was rescinded. Shortly thereafter I was fired. They discovered and confiscated only one of my notebooks, however, thinking it was everything. Apparently, they did not know that I was compiling a card file. My home was not searched at the time, and I was not arrested. I was shaken up, though. I decided to spread some of my materials among friends for safekeeping. Some of the copies of documents I had smuggled out of the archive I gave to foreign correspondents for publication in the event of my arrest.
At school I also encountered difficulties, which led to my being kicked out of the Historical-Archives Institute.5 Thus, I had lost the opportunity to work and go to school. Needing to support myself and also to have something to do, I began to give paid lectures about my work, which until then I had kept hidden from public view. In other words, I took the first steps to "legalize" my work. My first big speech was in April 1987 at the Central House of Writers (TsDL), a stenographic record of which appeared in a May issue of the emigre publication Russkaia mysl'. Q.: It was at this meeting that you first caught the public eye and became a celebrity. But how did you, then an unknown, get an opportunity to address such a gathering? A.: During the session at the Writers House, I simply passed a written request to the members of the presidium of the meeting (Mikhail Shatrov and Natan Edelman), asking to be allowed to speak about my work. The presidium read my note aloud, put it to a vote, and I was given the floor.
I should say that after publication in Russkaia mysl', I was summoned to a "conversation" with the Moscow oblast branch of the KGB. What bothered them was that I had been published abroad in an emigre paper. They warned me to discontinue my activities. I was not intimidated, however. I next wrote an article for the underground publication Glasnost' about the pending destruction of archival materials based on firsthand observation. Again I was summoned by the KGB. This time I was accused of having received foreign currency and drugs from the CIA. (The KGB asserted that the CIA was the source of Glasnost"s finances.6) A formally legal search of my home for foreign currency and drugs was carried out; of course, neither was found.
What they really wanted was to find out what materials I had at home, and to lay the groundwork for a break-in of my apartment that was carried out later, on 7 September 1987. At that time, in my absence, they broke in and confiscated 150 notebooks, not all the contents of which I had transferred to index cards, 15,000 to 20,000 index cards, and several books: Robert Conquest's The Great Terror [in Russian], Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago, Vsia Moskva for 1936, Ves' Leningrad for 1934, and others-in short, many of my most important sources. They could have done it all smoothly, leaving no trace of entrance, but they made it look 5 Iurasov claims that he was not permitted to take his exams. As others, including the school's rector Iurii Afanas'ev, tell the story, Iurasov either failed the exams he took, or decided not to take his exams because he knew he would fail. Iurasov does not deny that, insofar as school work was concerned, he was not among the school's most hard-working students.
6 Literaturnaia gazeta had published an article by a correspondent, Ion Andronov, in which Andronov, citing material published in the American weekly The Nation by Katrina vanden Heuvel, accused the journal Glasnost' of being in the pay of the CIA. Andronov, who was widely suspected of being a KGB plant on the prominent weekly's staff, was later expelled from the United States in connection with an intelligence scandal. But in the meantime everyone involved in the production of Glasnost' and many people who at one time or another had seen a copy of it inside the USSR were subjected to all manner of harassment. Copies of Glasnost' were also confiscated on the same pretext. like a criminal theft. I wrote a letter protesting this search and illegal confiscation to the Chairman of the KGB [then it was Chebrikov], but received no reply. Instead, I was summoned back to the KGB for an interrogation, during which they denied that they had taken anything from my apartment. If somebody had broken in, they said, it wasn't them. I was also questioned about my activities with Memorial (about our attempts to demonstrate and gather signatures on the street).
At Union.) The KGB must have planted a phone tap when they broke into my apartment. I was outraged. I demanded to be allowed to call home, to tell my mother that I had been illegally grabbed, without as much as being told of what I was accused of. I also insisted on writing a complaint to the procurator. They allowed me to call home, and promised to pass on my complaint.
I demanded further that they return the material they had stolen from my apartment. But they continued to deny involvement in the break-in. I was held for three days, and questioned each day, but at least they allowed me to sleep. After three days I was released: no explanation, no apology. To this day I don't think they were sure what they hoped to accomplish with this stupid provocation, my last conflict with the KGB. But to this day I have not gotten back what they stole from my apartment, and cannot be sure that they won't take similar actions in the future. Q.: During the time you began lecturing around the country, you continued your work in Memorial. What kinds of activities were you involved in? Q.: In November 1988 I took part in the Week of Conscience organized by a number of progressive journals. There were events and exhibitions every day, each with a different theme. It all took place on a grand scale, involving thousands of people, and was centered on the need to know and always remember one's past. The events were held at a Palace of Culture. There was a line to get in like the one outside the Lenin Mausoleum: tens of thousands of people. This was not surprising, since the events had been announced in the popular journal Ogonek. In the announcement, people were asked to bring documents and photographs detailing the repressions, and artists were asked to bring sketches for a monument. It was also announced that Iurasov, the young man with the card file who was recently seen on the program "Vzgliad," would conduct a reception.
Out of two rooms at the exhibit I organized a kind of research laboratory, where people could come and seek information about those they knew to have been repressed. I made gigantic lists on paper that we put up on the wall of over twenty thousand names from my card file. People came looking for the relatives and friends. There was also a list of the NKVD torturers (who in most cases themselves were also repressed). It was all an enormous amount of work.
We made a memorial wall with one thousand of the photographs that people brought, like a columbarium where the ashes of the dead are kept. There was also an exhibition of the sketches for a proposed monument to all the victims. We had maps of the camps, drawn to my specifications, with more than one hundred locations marked. (Remember, Solzhenitsyn's opus had still not been published in this country.) Bringing it all together, in a research laboratory, gave for the first time in our country a public sense of the scale and nature of what had happened in our country: Stalinism, Gulag, totalitarianism. It was a critical moment for us all. We retrieved the past and made it the important instrument, in the present and for the future, that had been our goal. One million visitors attended the weeklong events.
That week six thousand letters addressed to me from around the country arrived through the mail, and another three thousand were handed over to me personally. I added many names to my card file, and instructed people on how one went about finding out what had happened to missing relatives and friends. All they had were the incomprehensible pieces of paper testifying to rehabilitation, and another piece of paper with false information about dates and places of death. Some people had no information of any kind. It was the most difficult week I have ever experienced. Thousands and thousands of people, morning to night, needing to speak with me about their tragedies.
Once In November 1989, Andrei Sakharov wrote a letter and instructed me to carry it on a trip I was about to make to Vorkuta, where the miners had announced a strike, to give lectures about the Stalinist repressions there (it was a big Gulag site). (Others had also flown there: Seliunin, Zazlavskaia, Staravoitova.) I read aloud Sakharov's letter, in which he spoke about the justness of the miners' demands and also about the importance not simply of economic demands, but of political demands without which the economic issues could not be solved. As a commissar of Memorial, I emphasized the need to create a Memorial in Vorkuta.
During almost the entire year 1989, I was off giving lectures somewhere. There were still instances when my lectures were moved to a different day, or to a different room, evidently to reduce the size of the audience. Other times before being able to deliver a lecture I was put on a plane and simply sent out of a city by the authorities. Pressure was exerted on the organizers of my trips, and many were intimidated by the threats. If I was able to get to a city, I made sure to get on the local television and radio and to get an article in the local newspaper. Gathering information for my card file, I also did everything possible so that the locals would have a strong Memorial branch.
As a rule, after I had spoken in a given city, I began to receive letters, documents, and testimony from thousands of people. For collecting exact information about those who had been repressed, I made up a questionnaire, which was typed in multiple copies using carbon paper by volunteer typists and which I began to distribute beforehand at all my lectures. It was a huge territory to cover, and I had at first nineteen, and then nine, opponents. My main adversaries were General Kubassov, a well-known cosmonaut; Ion Andronov, billed as an international journalist and specialist on the USA and Canada who (it was not mentioned) had been kicked out of the USA and blacklisted in Moscow; the obkom first secretary Kondriukov; and the chairman of the oblast executive committee of the soviet Dmitriev. In other words, the entire local power structure, plus one formidable outsider, was arrayed against me.
The local political mafia did everything in their power to prevent me from meeting with voters. They slandered me continuously and mercilessly in the press. There was much voting fraud. In the end, Andronov was elected. Out there in Vladimir, no one knew him and his sordid past. On the contrary, he was lauded as exactly the kind of person needed for the new times: a person with international experience. In such fashion did longtime scoundrels use the electoral system to their advantage, and gain a second life.
Even though I lost-I got one hundred thousand votes-I gained tremendous political experience, learning how to conduct a dialogue with voters, how the election system worked, what methods people were capable of, and how powerful and influential the apparat was in the campaign. I do not at all regret my participation. On the contrary, I'm very grateful to have had the chance. In retrospect, I think that I would have won had I run in Moscow where I was better known. But I doubt I will try this again. I am, in any case, apolitical, as anyone fully committed to scholarship must be. Q.: How would you describe your philosophical outlook or world view? A.: Philosophically, since I am a Russian, I believe in the "Russian idea" as developed in the writings of Nikolai Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, and Aleksei Fedorov. In 1985-86, after I was demobilized from the army, I had a chance to read them in tamizdat. Basically, the "Russian idea" means that I cannot live anywhere besides Russia, no matter what catastrophes take place there. I feel the strongest connections to the culture and history of Russian people. I can only realize myself on Russian soil. In Russia there are now great difficulties, but they are artificial; that is, they have been created by foolish and wrong policies, and are not inherent in the culture. These difficulties make life in Russia very hard. Of course, here in the United States it would be easier to live, to work. But my life and work are devoted to the Russian people, and this people nourishes me spiritually.
Russia has its own way, a third way. The barbarism that Russia has experienced proves that we should not slavishly copy America or Europe. This goes for the market system, but especially for cultural matters. It so happens that the champions of the "Russian idea" in our country today are on the extreme right, and the form in which they propagate the Russian idea discredits the concept. Through their tendentious efforts the Russian idea has been debased and has become associated with crude nationalism. But to believe in the Russian idea should not in any way involve disrespect for other peoples. On the contrary, one must have the utmost respect not only for one's own people but for all peoples and the unique contributions each has to offer. We visited two uranium mining camps that had been opened during the Second World War, one in Pevek (in Chukotka) and the other in Butygychag (Kolyma). We also traveled to the so-called Elgen state farm, a former orphanage for children born in the camps that is described in Evgeniia Ginzburg's Journey into the Whirlwind. In short, we traced the entire Kolyma trail, seeing and recording the remnants of the camps, for example, in Ust-Omchug, Ust-Nera, Seimchan, Iagodnyi, and so on. We saw stone barracks, isolation cells, metal gates, barbed wire, guard towers, uniforms, utensils, all preserved. Of course, absolutely no one lives there today. We went by helicopter.
In Magadan itself, the capital of the region, we found and interviewed some survivors and filmed the headquarters of the former camp administration Dalstroi, still operating but now as a "regular" trust called North-Eastern Gold. It is still the biggest and sturdiest building in the city. Thus, it is quite possible to obtain a living impression of the old Kolyma camp system. They built these camps solidly, for the long term, and so their remains have survived, despite the severe climate.
The most important thing was just seeing the camps, way out there at the end of the earth, frozen solid. It makes your hair stand on end. What the Communists did can be compared only with what the German Fascists did. This all must be seen.
When I first started my work with the card file, I didn't realize the significance that I now see in it: the revival and preservation of the historical memory of the country. From the period of the Bolsheviks coming to power the history of the peoples of the Soviet Union was not simply destroyed; it was also deeply buried. Only falsifications ordered from above were allowed to be learned. The stolen truth must be restored, the names of those who lived, worked and died in the misguided utopia must be recalled.
Of course, I can't write about all the millions who died or suffered; for that, one person's life is not long enough. But I can help to restore the memory of concrete people, living and dead, who did not occupy important positions, who were not party members. Their lives and fate must be documented and passed on to future generations. The right of memory must be returned to the people and the false Bolshevik thesis-"there's a person, there's a problem; remove the person, you remove the problem"-must be repudiated forever. While humankind survives, it must preserve the memory of its forebearers, to remain human and to avoid becoming, as in the Chingiz Aitmatov story, people without memory, whom it is easier to make into slaves. Postscript
On the once again Liubianka Square, the stone brought from the Solovki islands that serves as a monument to the victims of repression now faces an empty pedestal that had supported the statue of the Cheka's founder, Feliks Dzierzin'ski. Moreover, after the events of August 1991, all Soviet archives, including those of the Party and the KGB, were ordered turned over to special commissions charged with transferring them to state jurisdiction. Memorial has thus seen two of its original goals fulfilled. And the association has finally received its own building, which, in addition to offices, houses a museum of repression. Lately, Memorial has been turning more and more of its attention back to where many of its founders began: the human rights movement. A number of its leaders now hold advisory positions in the Russian government's human rights commission. Some regional affiliates have restyled themselves as nongovernmental human rights monitors. Dmitrii Iurasov has accepted a post in the party archives.
